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Recent attention has focused on the UK’s productivity gap in the retail sector. Figure 1 shows 
an estimate of labour productivity in retail across countries, using output per hour worked. 
The UK lies well behind the US, France and Germany.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Reynolds at al (2005) contribute to this debate by providing a discussion of the literature, 
along side interviews with several UK and US retail firms. The conclusions of their paper are 
that, while there are many measurement issues, most of the evidence points to the fact that, on 
average, productivity in this sector in the UK is low and has grown slowly over recent years 
when compared to the US. They rightly point out that a more thorough understanding of what 
drives productivity in the retail sector requires a better understanding of the “complex mix of 
urban characteristics, consumer preferences and competitive rivalries”. 
 
In this article we discuss some of the main issues involved in the measurement of productivity 
in retail, how these problems can be tackled, and we consider the interpretation of these 
statistics. We then discuss new work using microdata on the UK supermarket industry and 
conclude with a short discussion of where future research needs to look to answer the 
important policy questions around why the UK’s productivity performance remains low in 
this important sector. 
 
Issues in measuring productivity 
 
Reynolds et al (2005) are right to point out that there are a number of concerns about 
measurement error in commonly reported measures. The main issues are the measurement of 
the quality and volume of inputs and output.
2 In the data that is most commonly used in the 
approaches discussed by Reynolds et al, productivity is measured by sales or value-added per 
worker or per hour worked. In some cases other inputs, such as land and capital usage, are 
also considered. Sales is quantity sold times the price at which it was sold. Value-added is 
output minus the cost of the goods sold and other ‘intermediate inputs’ like electricity.  
 
                                                    
1 The analysis contained in this paper was funded by the Advanced Institute of Management Research 
(AIM) All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authors. For correspondence: 
rgriffith@ifs.org.uk; h.harmgart@ucl.ac.uk; IFS, 7 Ridgmount Street, London, WC1E 7AE, UK. 
2 Griliches (1994) has a nice and comprehensive discussion of these issues and how they will affect the 
measurement of productivity.  
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Price is important here, because it gives us a way to compare units of different goods. It can 
provide information about the quality and value of the good sold, and of the retail services 
provided. Without information on price it would be very difficult to compare productivity 
across different industries or different types of retail establishment. Because of the key role 
played by price in measuring productivity, the main measurement issues comes down to the 
measurement of price, and what information we believe prices reflect.  
 
In markets that function well we generally think of price as accurately reflecting the quality 
and cost of producing a good. In perfectly competitive markets prices should do this very well. 
Where markets are imperfect, for example, because firms have market power (the ability to 
price above marginal cost) then prices may not provide an accurate reflection of either quality 
or costs. Instead they will reflect the degree of market power that a firm has, or in cross-
country comparisons they may reflect differences in the degree of competition in each market. 
For example, say we are comparing productivity in two different towns. In the first town there 
is only one store retailing milk. Planning regulation, say, has restricted the entry of new 
grocery stores. In the second town there are three stores selling milk, say because planning 
regulations are more lax in the second town. The store in the first town will be able to charge 
a higher price for milk than will any of the stores in the second town. This will increase the 
value of their sales, and thus will increase measured productivity, but will not necessarily 
reflect a “real” difference in productivity. 
 
A similar set of issues arises with the measurement of inputs. Is one worker, or one hour 
worked, the same as another? Is one square foot of land the same as another? Clearly they are 
not. Again, the price of labour and the price of land can help us. They can be used to reflect 
the contribution that input makes to generating sales and the quality of the input. If labour 
markets are functioning well, then the wage paid to workers should accurately reflect their 
marginal revenue product, that is their contribution to each additional pound of sales. This 
will be affected by the quality of the worker, along with the contribution and quality of other 
inputs. Similarly, if property markets are functioning well, then the rental value of a piece of 
land should reflect its marginal revenue product, which again will be heavily influenced by 
the quality and location of the land. Again, however, where these markets are not working 
well, due for example to restrictive planning regulation, prices will provide a less good 
picture. 
 
The point here is that prices can be very useful in allowing us to meaningfully aggregate the 
quantity sold and quantity of inputs used. They are the most useful when markets are working 
reasonably well. So, to the extent that we believe that retail markets are reasonably 
competitive, then these measurement problems should be fairly minor. However, all is not 
lost if they are not competitive. If we take the view that prices are not set competitively in 
these markets, then, with some knowledge of how prices are set, we can say something about 
the way in which the measurement of productivity will be affected, and the direction of bias 
they measurement error will induce.
3 When markets are not competitive, this generally means 
that the price will be higher than in a competitive market. This means that the value of output 
or of the inputs will be over stated - price will reflect not only the value of the output or input, 
but also the extent of market power. If this occurs in the output market this will lead to an 
overstatement of productivity, if prices are set non-competitively in input markets this will 
generally lead to an understatement of productivity. 
 
For example, if there is one dominant firm in an industry which is able to price higher than all 
other firms, not because of a difference in quality, but due, for example, to an inadvertent 
effect of regulation which conferred some market power on that firm. The value-added of this 
firm will then be greater than the other firms. If all firms use the same amount of inputs then 
the firm with market power will look like they are more productive, when in fact this 
                                                    
3 See Klette and Griliches (1996), Hall (1988) and large subsequent literature on this.  3
represents a difference in their market power. At the country level, if competition in one 
country is fiercer than in another, then firms in the country with less competitive markets will 
be able to charge a higher price, all else being equal. This will mean that they will look more 
productive than firms in the more competitive country.  
 
Looking at the numbers in Figure 1, where we see that US labour productivity is substantially 
higher than UK labour productivity, if we were to explain these differences by this type of 
measurement error in prices, we would have to believe that UK retail markets were 
substantially more competitive than US markets. This is not the general impression one gets, 
for example, when reading the Competition Commission’s recent report on supermarkets. We 
are therefore left to look for other explanations for this gap in productivity. 
 
One further comment is worth making. First, Reynolds et al raise the issue of comparing 
productivity across retail propositions. There should be no problem doing this, if we measure 
productivity correctly. There are two main issues that arise, both of which are not specific to 
retail. The first is the issue to do with prices, as discussed above. The second is related to the 
technology used. When firms are offering differentiated products (in this case different retail 
propositions - for example, superstore versus convenience store) then they may use quite 
different inputs in making this offering. For example, convenience stores may be more labour 
intensive, while superstores may use more automation. Thus, if we compare labour 
productivity between the two types of stores the smaller convenience stores may look much 
less productive. Yet if we fully account for all inputs they may be more comparable. For 
example, McKinsey (1998) find that, while the UK had lower labour productivity in retail in 
1995 in comparison to the US and France,
4 its capital productivity was in fact significantly 
higher in that year.
5 
 
The drivers of retail productivity 
 
Recent research has emphasised the importance of entry in driving productivity growth in 
retailing, as well as in other sectors. For example, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2002) find 
that productivity growth in retailing in the US largely occurs in new stores, rather than 
productivity growth in incumbent stores. They also show that the majority of productivity 
growth in the US has happened within firms rather than across firms - it is companies closing 
unproductive stores and open up productive ones rather than the entry of new firms.
6 The 
cumulative entry rates is 38.2% over the period 1987-1997, or about 3.3% on average per 
year. 
 
Haskel and Khawaja (2003) use similar data to Foster et. al., but for the UK. They find that, 
although annual entry rates in the UK are in fact much higher than in the US, between 8.7 % 
and 10.2% across all retail sectors between 1998-2000, albeit over a different time period, the 
contribution of new stores to aggregate productivity growth is much lower in the UK than in 
the US. They show that larger retailers have higher labour productivity, but that growth in 
labour productivity is fastest amongst the smallest retailers. 
 
These are interesting findings and certainly deserve further investigation. However, two 
important questions arise with respect to these findings. The first is, what is actually meant by 
                                                    
4 25% lower than France and 12% lower than the US 
5 50% higher than France and 67% higher than the US 
6 FHK’s analysis is at the establishment level and they follow the entrants from 1987-1992 to 1992-
1997 and measure their respective productivity. Within their sample most establishments exit within 
that period. The exit  is concentrated in the group of lowest productivity establishments (of the twenty 
percent of establishments with lowest productivity around 70%, or 14% of the whole sample, did not 
survive till the ten years).  4
entry in these papers. The second is that these papers do not directly look at what are the 
mechanisms driving growth. They carry out an accounting decomposition of where growth 
occurred, which is useful, but they do not explain what are the mechanisms or the causal 
relationships driving growth. 
 
As Haskel and Khawaja (2003) are careful to point out, an important limitation of the data 
used is that they are not collected at shop level. Thus entry and exit do not consist of shops 
opening and closing, which is ideally what we would like to study. Instead the data are held at 
the enterprise level, which roughly corresponds to a firm in a particular chain (for example if 
a supermarket chain owns supermarkets and DIY stores, these are two separate enterprises). 
The US data is also measured primarily at the establishment level, but in most cases in the US 
this is a single store, and in only a few cases comprises multi-unit establishments.
7 
 
In order to really understand the impact that entry is having on growth it is important first of 
all to have an idea of what is driving entry, and secondly to have good measures of entry, in 
order to relate them to productivity performance. 
 
To illustrate these ideas we look at one part of the retail industry - supermarkets - where more 
detailed and disaggregated data on entry is available. Supermarkets make up a substantial part 
of the retail trade in the UK, and the two largest UK retailers - Tesco and Sainsbury - are 
supermarkets (see Reynolds et al Table 6 from M+M Planet Retail).  
 
We use data from the Institute of Grocery Distribution (IGD), which includes information on 
all individual stores of the large grocery chains, all Co-ops and around 80% of independent 
grocery retailer. In total it lists around twelve and a half thousand stores in the UK. The 
advantage of this data is that we can observe entry, exit and refitting at the store level for 
almost all stores in the UK. Looking at this disaggregated data in more detail shows very 
interesting patterns of entry and exit in the period between 1980-2004.  
 
[Figures 2 and 3 here] 
 
Looking at the type of stores that the four large chains (Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda and 
Safeway/Wm Morrison) opened over the 1990s we see an increase in the number of smaller 
store formats, such as convenience stores, relative to supermarkets and other large store 
formats. Figure 2 show the striking increase in number of convenience stores opened by the 
big four. Figure 3 shows that increasingly more stores are being opening in high street and 
neighbourhood locations, rather than at edge-of-town or out-of-town sights.  
 
The firm that exemplifies this development most clearly is Tesco Stores. Figure 4 shows the 
number of stores opened each year by Tesco, by format. The opening of Tesco Express stores, 
their small centre-of-town format, has increased dramatically over the latter part of the 1990s 
and early 2000s. Although in terms of sales area Tesco Express still represent a small 
proportion of Tesco’s overall sales area, both with respect to the stock of existing stores and 
of entrants. This is because the average size of a Tesco Express is around 2,000 square feet, 
compared to a Tesco supermarket of around 27,000 or Tesco Extra hypermarket of 69,000.  
 
[Figures 4 and 5 here] 
 
The picture for Sainsbury looks similar, see Figure 5, with the biggest increase in number of 
store openings in their small neighbourhood/highstreet format - “Sainsbury Local”. The 
picture for Asda looks different, following more the Walmart strategy of opening one-type-
                                                    
7 Most of their data comes from a survey conducted every five years by the  Census of Retail Trade 
(CRT) .  5
fits-all large supermarket format. And due to the recent takeover of Safeway by Morrisons the 
picture of their strategy more difficult to see at the moment. 
 
These convenience store openings of course follow an earlier period where there was a large 
amount of closure of smaller format independent stores. But, there seems to be a clear 
strategy switch happening here in the at least some of the big supermarket chains. It may be 
that this pattern shows a UK retail strategy that is adapting to the particular preferences of UK 
consumers. In densely populated cities, where consumers like to buy fresh food, generally 
walk home from work and shop more than once a week, the optimal strategy may to be have a 
large number of small conveniently located stores.  
 
But has this change in strategy affected productivity? The literature discussed above seems to 
suggest that this is what is holding UK retail productivity back, the focus on the small store 
format. Yet Tesco has been one of the most successful UK firms, with recent growth in value-
added per worker and strong financial performance. 
 
More generally, how do we expect entry to affect productivity growth? There are two main 
mechanisms that have been emphasised in the literature - increasing competition, which 
drives out poorly performing stores, and the adoption of new technologies, which may be 
easiest when building a new store. In the UK, particular attention has focussed on the role of 
land use regulation and planning. It may be that this is stifling entry, or affecting the type of 
entry, and thus depressing competition and slowing the use and adoption of information and 
communication technologies (ICT). This seems plausible, but it seems important to marry up 
this effect with what looks like a strategic shift towards smaller format stores. 
 
There are at least two ways in which planning may affect productivity. First, planning 
regulations might result in retail stores operating below minimum efficient scale, and thus 
lead to lower productivity levels. Second, regulation might hinder the opening of new stores 
and closure of old ones. To the extent that retail productivity growth is due to firms closing 
older, low productivity stores, and opening newer, high productivity shops to replace them, 
this might result in lower productivity growth.
8  
 
In an international comparison Flath (2003) finds a lower store density in the UK than in most 
other European countries. The store density is similar to the US,
9 but, since car ownership and 
average travel distances to stores is much higher in the US, this could still be in line with a 
less competitive UK environment. Entry may therefore lead to lower prices and better quality 
offering through an increase in competition. The general perception that grocery prices tend 
to be higher in the UK than in other comparable EU countries and the US has led to repeated 
investigations of the supermarket industry.
10 Smith (2004) estimates the effect of supermarket 
competition on equilibrium prices in the UK. His findings provide evidence of a significant 
impact of market power on prices. Investigating this relationship further will help us to 
understand the precise impact of market concentration on productivity and prices. 
 
Recent work has also suggested that the adoption and use of ICT has been an important 
contributor to the US productivity acceleration of the late 1990s. It is likely that ICT usage is 
higher and more effective in larger and newer shops. Van Ark et al (2002) and Basu et al 
(2003) argue that the productivity difference between the US and the UK can be partly 
explained by differences in ICT investment. In both countries ICT use and industry 
productivity growth are highly correlated. Since retail accounts for an important part of this 
                                                    
8 Of course, regulation and planning are likely to have beneficial effects as well, on land use, the 
environment, and the quality of life, among others. 
9 Measured in number of stores per 1000 inhabitants. 
10 An initial investitigation was conducted by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in 1998 and 
subsequently by the Competition Commision in 2000.  6
productivity differential, it is crucial to understand the role of ICT investment in retail.  
Interestingly, Oulton and Srinivasan (2004) document that overall retailing is one of the 
biggest contributors to the ICT capital deepening over the 90s in the UK.  
 
Does this suggest that the UK is starting to catch up with the US in terms of ICT investment? 
The aggregate numbers shown in Figure 1 do not lend any support to this idea. Or is it that 
only a few leading UK firms – like Tesco – have successfully adapted their strategy, and we 
will be left with  along tail of poor performers? If this is the case, it might explain why the 
ICT capital deepening has not been picked up in more aggregated measures of productivity in 
retail. Maybe the heterogeneity we see on the micro level, with companies like Tesco leading 
in strategy adaptation and productivity growth,  is only the first sign of change. For the whole 




So where does this leave us? International productivity comparisons can be a useful tool for 
governments in informing their broad policy agenda. The job of policy makers is to ensure 
that markets function well and enable firms and individuals to work efficiently and effectively 
and that firms, workers and consumers face the appropriate incentives to invest, work and 
consume. International comparisons can help us to learn about whether markets are working 
well and about what sorts of policies are in place which are and are not effective. Within a 
single country we rarely see sufficient variation in policies or institutions to enable us to 
identify which work effectively and which do not. Cross country comparisons help us do this, 
but they must be interpreted judiciously. There are a number of reasons why measured 
productivity may differ, which do not necessarily reflect underlying differences in 
productivity. Recent work has rightly focussed on micro level measures of productivity, 
which can then be used to inform the debate about macro economic performance. 
 
Many of the measurement problems stressed in the literature can be handled by careful 
consideration of the likely impact they will have on measurement. Rather than throwing up 
our hands in despair we can systematically think through which types of measurement error 
are likely to be most important, and what effect they are likely to have on measures of interest 
(in which direction they are likely to effect the measures of interest). In addition, there is now 
the potential for much careful work on measuring productivity at the micro level.  
 
Reynolds et. al. state that firm level data are worse for retailing than manufacturing, but in 
many ways the data in retail, at least for supermarkets, are much better. Data are available at 
the individual store level, we know what prices consumers pay from marketing data, and we 
have good measures of the quality of goods purchased, if not of other amenities and services 
provided. This means that we have the opportunity to actually measure prices correctly, and 
to consider how firm and consumer behaviour affect them. There is also a wealth of data at 
the firm and establishment level. Economic researchers are only just beginning to put this data 
together in order to gain a better understanding of the nature of competition in the industry 
and the way in which productivity is and has evolved in the UK. But it looks like this will be 
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